Archive for January, 2013

Involuntary Dissolution of a Limited Liability Company under California Law: How is it different from involuntary dissolution of a Corporation?

Posted on January 22, 2013. Filed under: Uncategorized |

California Corporations Code section 1800 provides minority shareholders of corporations a remedy when the controlling ownership abuses its powers.   Corporations Code section 17351 offers similar remedies for aggrieved members and managers of limited liability companies.   Section 17351 provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may decree the dissolution of a limited liability company whenever any of the following occurs:

  1. It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.
  2. Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining members.
  3. The business of the limited liability company has been abandoned.
  4. The management of the limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissention.
  5. Those in control of the company have been guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.

(Corp. Code, § 17351, subd. (a).)

Unlike involuntary dissolution of corporations, section 17351 does not require a minimum level of ownership in order to have standing to petition for dissolution.  Indeed, a manager without any ownership interest in the company would apparently be authorized to bring a dissolution action, although in practice this would almost never happen because the members would remove and replace the manager if they opposed his action.

Section 17351 also differs from Section 1800 (involuntary dissolution of corporations) insofar as it removes (1) persistent unfairness to to a complaining owner; and (2) waste of company property as separate and independent basis for dissolution.  However, these grounds will almost always overlap with mismanagement and abuse of authority, or the protection of the rights and interests of the complaining members, so their omission from the statute is better understood as removing a redundancy than intending to allow persistent unfairness and waste in the context of limited liability companies.

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

What is a “minority discount” and why does it matter?

Posted on January 14, 2013. Filed under: Uncategorized |

The “minority discount” is a common issue that arises when valuing someone’s stake in a business.   As one court described it, “[a] minority discount adjusts for lack of control over the business entity on the theory that noncontrolling shares of stock are not worth their proportionate share of the firm’s value because they lack voting power to control corporate actions.” (Maughan v. Correia (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 507, 520, quoting [Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith (1999) 160 N.J. 383, 734 A.2d 738, 747].)  This is distinct from a “marketability discount” which “adjusts for a lack of liquidity in one’s interest in an entity, on the theory that there is a limited supply of potential buyers in a closely-held corporation.”  (Ibid.)

In Maughan v. Correia, (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 507, plaintiff bargained with her brother for an option to purchase approximately 22% of the corporation’s stock.  Her brother breached his obligations under the option agreement, and the trial court awarded damages equal to a 22% share of the company less the stock option price and a 40 percent minority discount.

The question on appeal was whether the trial court erred by applying the minority discount after subtracting the stock option purchase price.  The appellate court found that the minority discount should have been deducted from the value of 22% of the corporation first, and then the option purchase price should have been deducted from that value.
The trial court’s damages calculation is not consistent with the purpose of the minority discount, which, as the court acknowledged, is to “obtain a fair valuation of a minority interest.” …In addition, the $487,000 price at which [plaintiff] could exercise her option was a bargained-for, firm price mandated by the terms of the stock option agreement—specifically, $262,800 plus interest at two points over the prime rate. That option price was an independently negotiated sum, not tied to the fair market value of [plaintiff]’s interest. …
To be consistent with the law, the purpose of the minority discount, and the parties’ past treatment of this issue, and in fairness to [defendant], the trial court should have applied the 40 percent discount directly to the value of the additional minority interest [plaintiff] was entitled to purchase pursuant to the stock option agreement, so that [plaintiff]’s damages would reflect the true “intrinsic value” of her stock option.
Thus, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to correct the trial court error by first subtracting the minority discount from plaintiff’s share of the corporation, and then subtracting the purchase price of the option from that amount.  It is worth noting that in the context of the “buy-out” alternative to dissolution proceedings under California Corporations Code section 2000, no minority discount is applied to determine the buyout price of the minority shareholders’ interests.
[I]t is clear that upon distribution of the dissolution proceeds each of the shareholders would have been entitled to the exact same amount per share, with no consideration being given to whether the shares had been controlling or noncontrolling. [¶] Under the valuation approach adopted by the majority commissioners and confirmed by the trial court, however, a controlling shareholder, especially an unscrupulous one, could avoid the proportionate distribution which would follow from an involuntary dissolution simply by invoking the buy-out provisions of [the Corporations Code].  Thus, the very misconduct and unfairness which provoked the minority shareholders to seek involuntary dissolution could, in this manner, be used to further oppress them.  This, the statutory scheme before us cannot be read as condoning. Rather, the statutes suggest that a minority shareholder who brings an action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation should not, by virtue of the controlling invocation of the buy-out remedy, receive less than he would have received had the dissolution been allowed to proceed.
Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

Attorney Representing Shareholder Who Asserts Both Individual and Derivative Claims Not Subject to Disqualification

Posted on January 12, 2013. Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: , , , |

In Chih Teh Shen v. Miller (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 48, the California Court of Appeal held that an attorney may not be disqualified for simply representing an individual shareholder who alleges both individual and derivative claims. Shen and Miller were both 50 percent owners of Arnon Development Group, Inc. (Arnon).  Miller argued that Shen’s counsel should be disqualified for prosecuting derivative claims on behalf of Arnon in one action while simultaneously prosecuting individual claims against Arnon in another matter.

Typically, disqualification is not proper unless the offending lawyer represents or has represented the complaining party.  Here, Miller conceded that Shen’s attorney had no formal attorney-client relationship with Arnon.  Instead, he argued that Shen’s lawyer should be disqualified because he “represents the interests of the corporation” in the derivative action.  The Appellate Court rejected this argument. 

In essence, the corporation that is the subject of the derivative claim is generally a nominal party only. “ ‘Because the claims asserted and the relief sought in [the derivative] complaint would, if proven, advance rather than threaten the interests of the nominal defendant[ ], the nominal defendant [ ] must remain neutral in [the] action.’ [Citation.]” (Patrick, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 642.)
In this matter, Arnon is named in the derivative action both as a derivative plaintiff, and as a nominal defendant. However, Walton is listed as attorney for respondent Shen only. If Walton represented Arnon, there would be no need for a derivative action, as the corporation itself would be pursuing Shen’s claims.
Miller has presented no facts suggesting the formation of an attorney-client relationship between Walton and Arnon. Arnon has not sought or obtained legal advice from Walton at any time. Nor has Miller presented any authority for the proposition that Walton’s filing of the derivative action as Shen’s attorney is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship between Walton and Arnon. Because Miller has failed to meet his burden of proving that an attorney-client relationship exists between Walton and Arnon, Miller’s motion for disqualification of Walton was properly denied.

(Chih Teh Shen v. Miller, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 53.)
Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )


    Updates on the Law of Shareholder Oppression, Minority Rights, Corporate Dissolution and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers and Directors from a San Diego lawyer Bernard King


    Subscribe Via RSS

    • Subscribe with Bloglines
    • Add your feed to Newsburst from CNET
    • Subscribe in Google Reader
    • Add to My Yahoo!
    • Subscribe in NewsGator Online
    • The latest comments to all posts in RSS


Liked it here?
Why not try sites on the blogroll...